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1. Introduction 
Prior literature suggests that independent directors generally perform a better monitoring role 
than affiliated or inside directors regarding shareholder welfare (see, e.g., Fields and Keys, 2003; 
Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003). This is consistent with the reputational concerns of these 
directors as professional referees (Fama, 1980). Because some monitoring functions such as the 
reduction of managerial shirking or perquisite consumption, and the improvement of financial 
disclosure and transparency also redound to creditors’ benefit (Goh et al., 2012; Armstrong et al., 
2013), board independence may benefit bondholders as well. Consistent with these arguments, 
most studies document a negative association between independence and the cost of debt 
(Bhojraj and Sengupta, 2003; Anderson et al., 2004; Ertugrul and Hegde, 2008). 
     An average beneficial effect of board independence on the cost of debt, however, does not 
necessarily suggest there are no costs of independence on bondholders. It may simply suggest 
that overall the benefits of independence dominate its costs. Actually, the same argument that 
bondholders “free ride” on some monitoring benefits of independent directors for shareholders 
when the interests of these two stakeholders converge, also suggests that other potential actions 
an independent board takes may harm bondholders when the interests of the two stakeholders 
diverge, leading to the agency costs of debt (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Myers, 1977).  
Considering both the benefits and costs of board independence may also imply a differential 
impact of independence on the cost of debt. Given that the agency costs of debt are due to the 
conflict of interests between shareholders and bondholders (unless noted otherwise, abbreviated 
as the “B/S conflict” henceforth), it is expected that such costs increase with the severity of the 
conflict, which is commonly characterized by closeness to default or the level of financial 
leverage (Bodie and Taggart, 1978; John and John, 1993). Some benefits of board independence 
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such as improved financial transparency may also increase with the uncertainty over a firm as a 
result of financial distress (Sengupta, 1998). Therefore, both the benefits and costs of 
independence on bondholders may change monotonically over the intensity of the B/S conflict. If 
the rates of their changes differ, a differential impact of board independence on the cost of debt 
conditional on the B/S conflict is expected.3 Some prior studies examine a more pronounced 
effect of corporate governance on the cost of debt with the deterioration of credit quality, based 
on the idea that the default-associated uncertainty decreases the importance of financial 
statements and increases the role of governance (e.g., Bhojraj and Sengupta, 2003; Klock et al., 
2005). However, the consideration of both benefits and costs, and in particular their potentially 
different rates of changes with the intensification of the B/S conflict, suggests that not only the 
magnitude, but also the direction of the effect of corporate governance on the cost of debt may 
change with the B/S conflict. Therefore, an analysis of the differential impact of a governance 
mechanism on the cost of debt should not only supplement the analysis of its average effect as 
done in the literature, but may also change the conclusions drawn from it. 
Using a sample of S&P 1,500 firms between 2001 and 2005 with senior unsecured bonds 
outstanding, we study the differential impact of board independence on the cost of debt 
conditional on the expected severity of the B/S conflict. We utilize the passage of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 and the associated change in the listing standards instituted by the major 
exchanges (abbreviated collectively as SOX subsequently) as a natural experiment. Employing 
propensity score weighted difference-in-differences (DID) regressions (Hirano et al., 2003; 
Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009), we examine the effect of an exogenous increase of board 
                                                 
3 To better understand this argument, suppose that the costs of board independence are lower than the benefits at 
mild degree of the B/S conflict, but increase at a faster rate than the benefits, eventually exceeding the benefits after 
a certain level of the conflict. Then the impact of independence on the cost of debt should be negative if the B/S 
conflict is mild, but positive if it is severe.  
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independence on the change of the cost of debt. This methodology distinguishes our study from 
the rest of the literature, which relies on cross-sectional identification strategies and hence is 
susceptible to the endogeneity concern. We also note that few financial studies in general have 
employed the propensity score weighted regression methodology (see Malmendier and Tate, 
2009; Stuart and Yim, 2010; Yim, 2013 for some exceptions).  
To identify the noncompliant (treatment) firms, we focus on the SOX requirements that the 
board of all listed companies be comprised of a majority of independent directors and that all the 
members of a firm’s audit committee be independent. In contrast to most prior studies (Bhojraj 
and Sengupta, 2003; Anderson et al., 2004; Ertugrul and Hegde, 2008), we do not find an overall 
significant effect of board independence on the cost of debt, suggesting a balance of the benefits 
and costs of independent directors on bondholders. However, consistent with a differential 
impact of board independence on the cost of debt, we find that higher independence results in a 
significantly lower cost of debt when the expected B/S conflict is mild, but a significantly higher 
cost of debt when the conflict is severe. 
In order to buttress the assertion that independent directors act in the interest of shareholders 
rather than bondholders, we examine the effects of board independence on the firm’s subsequent 
risk profile and payout policies - two corporate actions that may benefit one stakeholder but hurt 
the other. Consistent with this view, we document that an exogenous increase in board 
independence leads to an increase in risk-taking behavior, which presumably benefits 
shareholders but hurts bondholders. However, we do not find a significant effect of 
independence on payout policy (dividends and repurchases).  
We contribute to the literature in several dimensions. The divergent effect of board 
independence on the cost of debt depending on contingencies adds to the literature which argues 
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that “one-size-fits-all” regulations may have unintended consequences (Chhaochharia and 
Grinstein, 2007; Wintoki, 2007; Linck et al., 2009; DeFond et al., 2011; Chen, 2013). Though 
both Chen (2013) and we analyze a differential effect of board independence on credit risk, Chen 
(2013) focuses on credit ratings and a non-monotonic impact, and we study bond spreads and 
cross-sectional variations of the impact conditional on the expected B/S conflict. 
The opposite effect of board independence on the cost of debt contingent on credit condition 
also suggests that the common perception in the literature that governance matters more for 
bondholders under higher default risk may be misleading. Our results demonstrate that not only 
the magnitude, but also the direction of the effect of corporate governance on the cost of debt 
may change with a firm’s credit condition.   
The risk-increasing effect of board independence also adds to the related literature. In contrast 
to our finding, most prior studies document either a negative (e.g., Bargeron et al., 2010; Ni and 
Purda, 2012), or an insignificant relation between independence and risk-taking (e.g., Cheng, 
2008). However, with the exception of  Bargeron et al. (2010), most studies rely on cross-
sectional variations, which are susceptible to the endogeneity concern.4 Although a few studies 
employ an instrumental variable (IV) approach, there is still concern for the validity of their IVs. 
For example, Ni and Purda (2012) use CEO tenure as an IV for board independence. But Chen 
and Zheng (2013) argue and find evidence that CEO tenure matters for risk-taking behavior. It is 
notable that in analyzing the 2008 financial crisis, Beltratti and Stulz (2012) find that banks with 
                                                 
4 In unreported analysis, we find some potential explanations for the difference in results between our study and 
Bargeron et al. (2010), though both employ SOX as a natural experiment. First, while we define 2002 as the 
treatment year, Bargeron et al. (2010) set 2001 as the treatment year, but still define the post SOX dummy to be one 
if the year is on or after 2003. This may be problematic since some noncompliant (compliant) firms at 2001 would 
become compliant (noncompliant) by 2002, and hence should no longer be treated as noncompliant (compliant). 
Second, Bargeron et al. (2010) include less control variables. Third, Bargeron et al. (2010) do not employ propensity 
score method to address the issue of the dissimilarity between noncompliant and compliant firms. Fourth, in 
Bargeron et al. (2010), standard errors are not adjusted for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. Finally, while we 
use the requirements for both the majority independence of entire boards and the full independence of audit 
committees to identify noncompliant firms, Bargeron et al. (2010) focus on the majority independence standard.   
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more shareholder-friendly boards including more independent boards, are riskier. Consistent 
with our view, Beltratti and Stulz (2012) argue that these firms took excessive risks ex-ante in 
the interest of shareholders, but due to the financial crisis suffered the downside of risk-taking. 
The positive effect of board independence on managerial risk-taking also provides a different 
perspective to evaluate the effect of SOX as compared with the existing research. Most studies 
document that SOX discourages risk-taking (e.g., Cohen et al., 2009; Bargeron et al., 2010). 
Consistent with these studies, we show that risk-taking overall decreased post SOX. However, 
firms that were not in compliance with the independence requirement before SOX experienced a 
smaller decrease. Therefore, our results suggest that although many provisions in SOX, such as 
increased executive and director personal liabilities and the rules related to internal controls may 
discourage managerial risk-taking (Bargeron et al., 2010), the requirement of higher board 
independence nevertheless promotes risk-taking.   
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data, variables, 
and summary statistics. This section also describes the timelines and provisions of SOX that are 
relevant for our study. Section 3 presents the empirical specifications and results. Section 4 
reports the results of robustness checks on our empirical findings. Finally, Section 5 concludes.   
2. Data, SOX Provisions, Variables, and Summary Statistics 
2.1.  Data and Sample 
The Appendix provides detailed descriptions of the variables used in our empirical analysis as 
well as their data sources. Consequently here we provide only a brief description of each. 
Following the literature, we use bond yield spread as a measure of the cost of debt. Our bond 
data are taken from a proprietary database from S&P that contains the prices and issue 
characteristics of all publicly traded senior unsecured corporate bonds as of the end of March 
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between 2002 and 2006. The year range and the inclusion of only senior unsecured bonds are a 
result of data limitations. But senior unsecured bonds are the most prevalent of corporate debt 
securities.5 To match the year convention in COMPUSTAT, the time range for the bond data is 
converted to be from 2001 to 2005.6 The Treasury bond data used to calculate yield spreads are 
from the Federal Reserve Bank Report. 
Board composition data are from RiskMetrics (formerly IRRC) Director Database. The 
RiskMetrics database covers primarily the S&P 1,500 firms. We obtain data from CRSP to 
calculate equity volatility and stock returns. Financial data are from COMPUSTAT, including 
data for payout policy and indicators of the B/S conflict. 
Our empirical analyses include both firm- and bond-level regressions. Because the firm-level 
data are available in earlier years, the samples for risk-taking and payout policy regressions 
extend back to 1996, the starting year of the RiskMetrics database. This increases the sample 
sizes and provides more comparability with prior studies, which typically employ multiple years’ 
data.7 Our sample for the cost of debt regressions is an unbalanced panel between 2001 and 
2005, with 6,252 bond-year and 1,610 firm-year observations.8  
                                                 
5 For example, Chava et al. (2010) show that 82.7% of newly issued corporate bonds are senior unsecured. In our 
sample the number of issues per firm is 3.88, which matches closely the statistics in Cremers et al. (2007) based on 
various types of bonds, further suggesting that our bond coverage is not significantly different from the literature. 
6 COMPUSTAT sets a year to be t if the fiscal year end-of-month for the firm is between June, year t and May, year 
t+1. Since our bond data are at the end of March, the year t in the bond data corresponds to year t-1 in 
COMPUSTAT. This can also alleviate the endogeneity concern as most of the financial and governance variables 
are in place before we calculate spreads.  
7 As pointed out by Bertrand et al. (2004), a concern for the DID specification with multiple years’ data is that the 
standard errors may be severely underestimated. In unreported analysis, we follow their correction method and 
create an alternative sample with one year’s observation before SOX and one year after, by averaging a firm’s pre-
SOX (and post-SOX) observations into a single observation. We find that our results are qualitatively similar. We 
also do the same for the cost of debt samples, and find similar results as well.  
8 Sample sizes may vary depending on the proxies for the B/S conflict. This sample size refers to using S&P credit 
rating as a proxy for the credit condition of a firm. Our results are qualitatively similar for a sample formed by 
randomly selecting one issue from all the issues of a firm in a given year. The results are also similar if the sample 
consists of bonds that appear at both 2002 and 2005. This ensures that we calculate the post-SOX change of bond 
spread for the same bond. Our results are also similar for two of the four models with respect to the four B/S conflict 
proxies, if we average the issue-level variables (bond spread, modified duration, convexity, and bond age) into firm-
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Our samples include firms with dual-class stocks as well as finance and utility companies. In 
unreported analysis, we exclude these firms and our results are substantially similar.  
2.2.  Relevant SOX Provisions and Timelines  
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act was signed into law on July 30, 2002. In February 2002, the SEC 
requested the exchanges to improve their governance listing standards. In August and October 
2002 respectively, the NYSE and NASDAQ submitted proposed changes to the SEC. These 
proposals were approved with minor changes in November 2003. Given the corporate climate at 
the time, the ex-ante probability of disapproval was minimal. Therefore, 2002 is appropriate to 
serve as the treatment year in our DID methodology. The compliance statistics reported later are 
consistent with this assumption. 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires audit committees to be fully independent. The three major 
exchanges, NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX further require their listed firms to have a majority of 
independent directors. Because we study the effect of board independence on the cost of debt, it 
seems appropriate to use the majority independence requirement to identify noncompliant firms. 
However, for two reasons we choose to use both the majority independence requirement and the 
full independence requirement for audit committees to identify noncompliance. First, the fact 
that not every firm issues public bonds, together with the fact that a supermajority of the firms in 
our sample were already in compliance with the majority independence requirement before the 
enactment of SOX, reduces the number of noncompliant firms significantly. If we focus 
exclusively on the majority requirement to identify noncompliant firms we are left with only 20 
firms and 65 bonds for the cost of debt regressions. This may raise the concern that our results 
are driven by a small number of “outliers”. Second, the increased workload and liabilities of 
                                                                                                                                                             
level variables by taking the weighted averages of the issue variables of a firm in a given year, with the weight being 
the size of the issue as a fraction of the total issue sizes.   
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independent directors around the time when SOX was enacted (Linck et al., 2009), suggest that 
the independent vacancies on audit committees are more likely to be filled by externally 
recruited new directors, rather than the existing ones. In addition, the SOX requirement of at 
least one financial expert on audit committees should also increase the demand for new 
independent directors.9 These arguments suggest that a firm without a fully independent audit 
committee may choose to hire new independent directors, which makes the non-independence of 
audit committees a valid criterion to identify noncompliance. Indeed, using the RiskMetrics 
database, we find that 83% of the firms without an independent audit committee at 2002 
increased their board independence after SOX, despite the fact that these firms already had a 
majority of independent directors before SOX. Prior studies have used both the majority and 
audit committee independence requirements to identify noncompliant firms. For example, while 
Duchin et al. (2010) define noncompliance based on audit committee independence, Armstrong 
et al. (2013) focus on majority independence. Specifically, we define a firm as noncompliant if at 
2002 it did not have a majority of independent directors or a fully independent audit committee, 
and became majority independent or, in the case of audit committee non-independence, increased 
its board independence post SOX. To determine whether a firm increased board independence 
post SOX, we compare the independence at 2002 with the maximum value of independence 
between 2003 and 2005. 10 The above definition of noncompliance ensures that each of the 
                                                 
9 This may raise the concern that our results on the effect of board independence on the cost of debt could be 
attributed to the effect of independent financial expert. This possibility is not inconsistent with our argument, 
because while we focus on the motivation of independent directors to monitor management in the interest of 
shareholders, effective monitoring may require different areas of expertise with financial expertise as one of them. 
But sorting out the motivation and the ability is beyond the scope of this paper. 
10 Our results are even stronger if we compare board independence at 2002 with that of 2005 to determine whether a 
firm increased independence after SOX. We use the maximum value of board independence between 2003 and 2005 
in our primary analysis to increase the number of noncompliant firms. Note that this definition of noncompliance 
means that firms that did not have a majority of independent directors or a fully independent audit committee at 
2002 and did not increase their board independence post SOX were classified as compliant. Our results are similar if 
we drop these firms from the sample.   
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noncompliant firms indeed increased its independence after SOX. Our definition of 
noncompliance results in 71 noncompliant firms with 260 bonds at 2002. 11  In unreported 
analysis, we find that our major results are robust to the definition of noncompliance based on 
majority independence only. 
The exchanges required firms to adopt the new governance standards during their first annual 
meeting after January 15, 2004, but no later than October 31, 2004. Firms with classified boards 
were given until the second annual meeting to comply, but no later than December 31, 2005. 
Therefore, it is appropriate to end our sample at 2005 for the implementation of the DID strategy. 
We thus have two years on or before 2002, the treatment year, and three years thereafter.      
2.3.  Variables     
2.3.1 Board Independence 
RiskMetrics defines a director to be independent if she is not a current employee of the firm 
or affiliated with the firm. This definition closely follows that of the exchanges, but is somewhat 
stricter (Chhaochharia and Grinstein, 2009). NYSE and NASDAQ classify a director as 
independent even if she was a former employee of the firm, provided that her employment 
terminated at least three years prior to the directorship. In addition, the two exchanges classify an 
affiliated director as independent if her business transactions with the firm are inconsequential. 
In contrast, regardless of the termination date and transaction amount, a director is regarded as 
non-independent by RiskMetrics if she had worked for the firm, or if she has any business 
transactions with the firm. Since RiskMetrics does not provide the amount of transactions, we 
follow Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009) and partially adjust the independence status in the 
                                                 
11 These numbers refer to the cost of debt sample with credit rating as the measure of the B/S conflict. Because Z-
scores include a significant number of missing observations, the number of noncompliant firms (bonds) based on Z-
score as the B/S conflict proxy is only 32 (104). Because the samples on risk-taking and payout policy are not 
confined to public bonds, they have much larger numbers of the noncompliant firms. For example, the number of 
noncompliant firms for the risk-taking sample is 191. 
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data by re-classifying an affiliated director as independent if her former employment with the 
firm had ended for at least three years, the director does not currently provide professional 
services to the firm, and she is not an interlocking director.12 As pointed out by Chhaochharia 
and Grinstein (2009), the stricter definition of independence by RiskMetrics should make it 
harder to detect a significant relation between independence and dependent variables, because 
some noncompliant firms according to RiskMetrics actually may be compliant.   
2.3.2 Bond Spread 
We calculate the yield spread of a bond as the difference between the bond’s yield-to-maturity 
(YTM) and the YTM of the Treasury bond matched by the closest maturity. As a robustness 
check, we also calculate spreads by the difference between the YTM of a bond and the linearly-
interpolated YTM of the Treasury bond with identical maturity. The results are similar. 
2.3.3 Indicators of the Agency Conflict Between Shareholders and Bondholders 
Because a firm with higher default risk or more debt is expected to have severer B/S conflict, 
we use credit condition and leverage as indicators of the degree of the conflict (Bodie and 
Taggart, 1978; John and John, 1993). Our first proxy of credit condition is the S&P long-term 
issuer credit rating. It is notable that this rating is a measure of the creditworthiness of the firm as 
a whole rather than any of its bonds. We also use Altman’s Z-score (Altman, 1968) and interest 
coverage ratio (Asquith et al., 1994) as two alternative measures of credit condition. A lower Z-
score or interest coverage ratio indicates that the firm is closer to financial default. 
2.3.4 Managerial Risk-Taking 
                                                 
12 In unreported analysis, we further redefine all affiliated directors as independent regardless of the amounts of their 
business transactions. This is likely to have reclassified too many affiliated directors into independent directors. As a 
result, the number of noncompliant firms at 2002 shrank dramatically to only 4 (with 24 bonds) for the cost of debt 
sample; hence the results should be interpreted with caution. Nonetheless, our major results based on this 
reclassification of independence are similar to the reported results.  
  12
We follow many others and use equity volatility as the primary measure of managerial risk-
taking (e.g., Brick et al., 2012). This measure is necessarily noisy because volatility is affected 
by market factors beyond risk-taking. Therefore, in the robustness checks we also examine the 
impact of board independence on several corporate policies that may indicate managerial risk-
taking. Because the distribution of volatility is highly skewed, we take the log of this variable. 
2.3.5 Payout Policy 
We calculate the dividend payouts and stock repurchases in our primary analysis following 
Grinstein and Michaely (2005), where repurchases include both common and preferred stocks. 
The results are similar if we exclude preferred stocks (Grullon and Michaely, 2002), or use 
treasury common stocks in the calculation of repurchases (Fama and French, 2001). 
Because it may take some time for the new independent directors to influence corporate 
decision making, we calculate the risk-taking and payout variables in the following year.  
2.3.6 Control Variables 
We follow prior studies to control for a number of variables in our regressions. The cost of 
debt regressions include both issue- and firm-level control variables. The issue-level variables 
include modified duration and convexity to proxy for the systematic risk of bond returns, and 
bond age to indicate liquidity.13 Older bonds are generally less liquid and hence may have higher 
spreads, ceteris paribus (Klock et al., 2005). The firm-level controls include financial variables 
and rating dummies.14 The financial controls include leverage, firm size, ROA, market-to-book 
                                                 
13 In unreported analysis we also control for four indicators of bond covenants, including investment restrictions, 
financing restrictions, dividend restrictions, and event-risk restrictions. The definitions of these dummy variables 
follow Chava et al. (2010). Our results are similar.  
14 We do not control for governance variables in our primary analysis to preserve the sample sizes. In unreported 
robustness analysis, we control for a number of governance variables following the literature, including 
compensation vega and delta (Shaw, 2012), board size (Anderson et al., 2004), institutional and block holdings 
(Bhojraj and Sengupta, 2003; Cremers et al., 2007), the G-index (Klock et al., 2005), the L-index (Bradley and 
Chen, 2011), and classified board dummy (Chen, 2012). The results are similar except for those with respect to 
interest coverage ratio.  
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ratio, and sales growth rate (Bhojraj and Sengupta, 2003; Anderson et al., 2004). We also control 
for firm age to account for the possibility that more established firms may have lower credit risk. 
We control for rating dummies based on the 7 categories of S&P ratings in Ashbaugh-Skaife et 
al. (2006). We also control for equity volatility, dividend payout, and stock repurchase in the 
current year in the cost of debt regressions, to examine whether these variables are indeed 
associated with a higher cost of debt. Nonetheless, we do not expect that these variables fully 
account for the adverse effect of board independence on bondholders, because the B/S conflict 
also resides in other aspects of corporate actions, some of which may be even unobservable. In 
the risk-taking regressions, we control for CEO compensation vega and delta, CEO tenure and 
age, firm size, return on assets (ROA), market-to-book ratio, sales growth rate, firm age, R&D 
expense, capital expenditure, leverage, cash balance, and number of business segments (Coles et 
al., 2006; Cheng, 2008). We also control for the lagged equity volatility to alleviate the omitted 
variable bias (Brick et al., 2012). The control variables in the payout regressions include CEO 
tenure, firm size, ROA, market-to-book ratio, sales growth rate, firm age, leverage, cash balance, 
CEO shareholdings, CEO un-exercisable and exercisable options, and stock return (Hu and 
Kumar, 2004; Skinner, 2008; Sharma, 2011). 
To account for outliers, we take the log of, or winsorize all variables at the 1st and 99th 
percentiles.  
2.4.  Summary Statistics 
Table 1 reports the summary statistics of the major variables, the compliance trend, and the 
comparisons of the key variables of interest between the noncompliant and compliant firms. 
Panel A lists the summary statistics. Except for the variables that are unique to the cost of debt 
regressions which are reported at the bond level, the summary statistics for other variables are 
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reported at the firm level for a sample with non-missing common variables in the volatility and 
payout regressions. For the cost of debt regressions we report both the statistics for the full 
sample and, pursuant to our purpose in this paper, the statistics conditional on the expected 
severity of the B/S conflict. To save space, we only report the sub-sample statistics of yield 
spread, board independence, and the four indicators of the B/S conflict stratified by the median 
rating in the sample (BBB+). The summary statistics show that the mean (median) spread for the 
full sample is 2.46% (1.53%). The bond spreads in our sample are slightly larger than those in 
the literature (Bhojraj and Sengupta, 2003; Anderson et al., 2004; Klock et al., 2005), 
presumably reflecting our more recent time period. Our sample also shows a mean (median) 
board independence of 0.68 (0.71). The high proportion of independent directors in our sample 
firms is consistent with the statistics reported in related studies over a comparable time period 
(e.g., Chhaochharia and Grinstein, 2009; Armstrong et al., 2013), and the upward trend in board 
independence over time (Linck et al., 2009).  
As expected, the sub-sample statistics show that low-rated firms have higher spreads and 
leverage, and lower Z-scores and interest coverage ratios. High-rated firms have slightly higher 
board independence than low-rated firms (0.75 vs 0.73). An unreported t-test indicates that the 
difference is statistically significant.15   
Panel B presents the compliance trend between 2000 and 2005. Because these statistics are at 
the firm level, they are based on the sample with non-missing common variables in the volatility 
and payout regressions. We report the annual statistics of board independence, as well as the 
fractions of firms without majority independent boards or fully independent audit committees.16 
                                                 
15 This result is based on statistics reported at the issue level. If keeping only one observation per firm in a given 
year, high-rated firms still have slightly higher board independence than low-rated firms (0.76 vs 0.73).  
16 Note that because the definition of noncompliance requires the comparison between board independence before 
and after SOX, it is not convenient to list the annual fraction of the noncompliant firms. For example, if the year is 
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The statistics suggest a general upward trend for board independence even before the enactment 
of SOX. We find a similar pattern for an even earlier time period. The positive trend for 
independence presumably reflects the effect of shareholder activism (Gillan and Starks, 2007), 
and the 1999 NYSE rule for independent audit committees. Despite the uptrend of independence 
over time, however, Panel B shows a significant increase of independence between 2002 and 
2003 relative to other years, which is right after SOX took effect. Therefore, it is appropriate to 
use 2002 as the treatment year in our DID methodology. 
It is notable that a portion of the firms were still not compliant as required by SOX by 2005. 
This puzzle is shared by other studies using the RiskMetrics data (e.g., Chhaochharia and 
Grinstein, 2009; Kim and Lu, 2012). Our manual search of a random sample suggests that a vast 
majority of these firms actually declared compliance. Therefore, this puzzle seems to be driven 
by the stricter definition of independence based on RiskMetrics than the exchanges.  
Panel C compares the changes in some key variables of interest between 2002 and 2005 for 
the noncompliant and compliant firms. We also compare the changes conditional on credit 
ratings. The results based on other measures of the B/S conflict are qualitatively similar. We 
report the statistics for independence at both the issue and firm levels. We also report the number 
of firms/bonds that the statistics are based on.17  
As expected, the independence of the noncompliant firms increased significantly more than 
that of the compliant firms regardless of the sample. On average, the noncompliant firms added 
1.26 more independent directors in the post-SOX period. At the same time, the noncompliant 
                                                                                                                                                             
after 2002 (post-SOX), to calculate the fraction of the firms that are noncompliant based on our definition, we need 
to compare the board independence at that year with the maximum value of independence post-SOX, which is not 
meaningful for the years after SOX.   
17 Because the calculation of the statistics essentially requires the bonds to be available at both 2002 and 2005, the 
numbers of noncompliant firms/bonds reported in the panel are smaller than the numbers of noncompliant 
firms/bonds mentioned earlier (71/260).  
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firms removed more inside and linked (affiliated) directors than the compliant firms, leaving 
board sizes unchanged. Therefore, the statistics suggest that rather than simply adding more 
independent directors, noncompliant firms replaced some of their non-independent directors with 
the independent directors. To ensure that the noncompliant firms identified through the audit 
committee independence requirement did indeed increase their board independence post SOX, 
we also compare the change of board independence of firms without fully independent audit 
committees but with majority independent boards, with that of the compliant firms. The statistics 
are consistent with our expectations - the noncompliant firms identified through the audit 
committee independence requirement added 0.92 more independent directors than the compliant 
firms. However, the statistics in Panel C do not detect a significant difference in the changes of 
volatility and payout policy variables between the noncompliant and compliant firms.  
Panel C also shows that the changes in bond spreads are similar between the noncompliant 
and compliant firms, despite a significantly greater increase in board independence by the 
former. However, the sub-sample statistics suggest that the similarity between the changes of 
bond spreads holds only for firms with high ratings. For low-rated firms, the bond spreads of the 
noncompliant firms increased significantly more relative to the compliant firms. Therefore, these 
results provide preliminary evidence consistent with a differential impact of board independence 
on the cost of debt conditional on the B/S conflict. 
3. Methodology and Empirical Results 
In this section we first discuss our empirical model specifications. Next we examine the 
determinants of the propensity score – the probability of being noncompliant at 2002, to be used 
in weighting the DID regressions. We then present our primary analysis, the examination of the 
differential impact of board independence on the cost of debt conditional on the expected B/S 
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conflict. Finally, as some examples of the costs of independence for bondholders, we study the 
effects of board independence on managerial risk-taking and payout policy.  
3.1.  Empirical Specification 
Our DID models for the cost of debt regressions are as follows:  
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In the above equation, Bond Spreadi,j,t is the yield spread of bond j of firm i at year t. 
Noncomplianti is a dummy variable that equals one if firm i is not compliant at 2002 as defined 
previously, and zero otherwise. Post-SOX is a dummy variable that equals one if the observation 
is on or after 2003, and zero otherwise. The control variables are as described in Section 2.3.6. αi 
is the fixed firm effect.18 Our primary coefficient of interest is β1, which represents the difference 
between the post-SOX changes of the dependent variables of the noncompliant and compliant 
firms. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and, in light of the issue-level 
regressions, are clustered at both the bond level (recognizing the autocorrelation) and firm-year 
level (recognizing the correlations of different bonds of the same firm in a given year).  
Our focus in this study is to analyze a potentially differential effect of board independence on 
the cost of debt, conditional on the severity of the B/S conflict. Two methods could serve this 
purpose. First, we could conduct sub-sample analyses according to specification (1), contingent 
on different levels of the B/S conflict. However, our previous discussion suggests that the 
numbers of noncompliant firms/bonds are generally small, which may raise the concern that our 
results are driven by the undue influence of some outliers. Because the small-number issue is 
more acute for sub-sample analysis, we focus on the second method to study a differential effect 
                                                 
18 Our major results are similar if controlling for firm as well as CEO fixed effects. The CEO fixed effect considers 
the possibility that the innate attributes of a CEO may affect corporate actions and the cost of debt. 
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(though still use the sub-sample analysis as a robustness check), which utilizes the full sample 
and interacts the treatment indicator, Noncomplianti * Post-SOX, with the proxy of the B/S 
conflict. A significant interaction term is consistent with a differential effect. This method has 
the added benefit of not being subject to another concern for sub-sample analysis, that the 
division of the sample into sub-samples is essentially arbitrary. However, sub-sample analysis 
has the advantage of not forcing the equality of the coefficients for the control variables across 
the sub-samples. In light of this issue, we also interact each of the control variables except for the 
firm fixed effects with the B/S conflict proxies. The above discussion suggests the following 
primary specification to study a differential impact of board independence, where we have 
abbreviated the B/S conflict proxy as “BSCP” to save space: 
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   (2) 
Our DID models for the regressions on equity volatility and payout policies are similarly 
specified, except that the regressions are at the firm level (hence standard errors are clustered at 
the firm level):                                                                                                               
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In (3), Volatility (Payout)i,t+1 is the equity volatility (payout) of firm i at year t+1.  
3.2.  Propensity Score Analysis 
An important assumption of the DID method is that the treatment and control firms are similar 
in the sense that the underlying time effect would have followed parallel paths for both in the 
absence of the treatment. However, given that board independence is endogenously determined 
(Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003), the assumption of the similarity between the noncompliant and 
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compliant firms is unlikely to be satisfied. A common solution to this problem is to match 
treatment firms with control firms based on the propensity score (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). 
Imbens and Wooldridge (2009) further recommend the combination of regressions with 
propensity score matching or weighting. Hirano et al. (2003) show that weighting based on the 
following algorithm leads to an efficient estimate of the average treatment effect on the treated:19  


 firmscompliant  for the)1/(
firmsnt noncomplia for the1
pp
w                                           (4) 
where p is an estimate of the propensity score.20 The above weighting scheme is intuitive, since 
it gives a greater weight to compliant firms with higher propensity score, which are presumably 
more similar to the noncompliant firms. We use the propensity score weighted DID regressions 
in our primary analysis, and propensity score matching in the robustness checks. 
We rely on previous studies on the determinants of board composition and audit committee 
independence for the covariates of the propensity score (Klein, 2002; Boone et al., 2007; Linck 
et al., 2008; Lehn et al., 2009). Our selection of the covariates is a balance of comprehensiveness 
and the need to preserve the sample sizes, since weighting based on the propensity score requires 
the availability of its determinants. The covariates in our primary regression include firm size, 
number of business segments, free cash flow, market-to-book ratio, sales growth rate, R&D 
expense, CEO shareholdings, a dummy variable indicating whether the CEO sits on the 
nomination (compensation) committee, shareholdings of independent directors, and ROA. This 
results in a sample size of 1,010 firms at 2002. Except for ROA, the covariates are based on the 
                                                 
19 This is the case in our study, because the post-SOX change of the compliant firms essentially serves as an estimate 
of the change of the noncompliant firms in the absence of the treatment.  
20  The exact implementation of the method in Hirano et al. (2003) requires a nonparametric estimate of the 
propensity score, which could be obtained through logit estimation with flexible functions of the covariates. 
However, the previous literature on the determinants of board composition focuses on the linear function of the 
covariates. Because we rely on these studies to identify the covariates of the propensity score, we also focus on the 
linear form. In this regard, our method is an approximation of the method proposed in Hirano et al. (2003). We note 
that many prior studies also have this feature (e.g., Malmendier and Tate, 2009; Stuart and Yim, 2010; Yim, 2013).  
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three hypotheses on board composition as in Boone et al. (2007): scope of operation, monitoring, 
and negotiation. Because we use these variables to predict noncompliance at 2002, we lag them 
by one year in the regressions. In Panel A of Table 2, we compare these variables for the 
noncompliant and compliant firms. The statistics show several significant differences, mainly for 
the governance variables. Specifically, compared with the compliant firms, the CEOs of the 
noncompliant firms tend to hold more equity shares and are more likely to sit on the committees. 
Besides, independent directors of the noncompliant firms also have more shareholdings.  
In Panel B we run logit regressions on a dummy variable indicating whether a firm is 
noncompliant or not at 2002. In addition to the control variables described above, we also 
include the Fama-French 48-industry dummies. Consistent with the statistics in Panel A, Model 
1 suggests that firms with more CEO shareholdings, firms whose CEOs sit on nomination or 
compensation committees, as well as firms with more independent director shareholdings are 
more likely to be noncompliant. The first three results are consistent with the negotiation 
hypothesis that a powerful CEO tends to select non-independent directors. The last result is 
consistent with the substitution between board independence and the shareholdings of 
independent directors in monitoring management. Interestingly, some variables that are not 
significantly different based on the t-tests in Panel A (firm size, free cash flow, and market-to-
book ratio), are significant in these regressions. The reverse is true for number of business 
segments and R&D expense, perhaps reflecting industry effects. The signs on firm size and 
market-to-book ratio are inconsistent with prior studies, presumably due both to the difference in 
samples and our inclusion of audit committee independence in defining noncompliance.21 But 
                                                 
21  Indeed, if we run logit regressions on the noncompliance dummy based solely on majority independence 
requirement, these two variables are no longer significant. Conditioning the regressions on firm sizes, Linck et al. 
(2008) find that the monitoring cost factor extracted from three variables including market-to-book ratio, is not 
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we note that another proxy for firms’ growth opportunities, the sales growth rate, is not 
significant. Lehn et al. (2009) present evidence of a nonlinear effect of firm size on board 
composition. Therefore, in Model 2 we include the squared term of firm size as an additional 
variable. Indeed, the results are consistent with a non-monotonic impact of firm size on 
noncompliance.  
In Model 3 we include a more comprehensive set of control variables, which reduces the 
sample to 850 observations. Note that none of these additional variables are significant. Because 
both Models 1 and 3 include a number of insignificant variables, we entertain a fourth model 
with only the significant determinants of the propensity score. The results are reported in Model 
4. We use Model 1 to estimate the propensity score in our primary analysis.22 In unreported 
analysis, we find that our results are similar using the other three models. 
An important requirement to implement the propensity score method is the satisfaction of the 
balancing property, that the treatment and control firms are indeed similar in terms of the 
propensity score and its covariates. In unreported analysis we find that among the four models in 
Panel B, only Model 1 satisfies the balancing property, which is another reason we employ this 
model in our primary analysis.  
3.3.  Board Independence and the Cost of Debt 
Using the estimated propensity score p and the weighting scheme in (4), we first examine the 
average effect of board independence on the cost of debt with specification (1). The results are 
reported in Model 1 of Table 3. The coefficient on Noncompliant * Post-SOX is positive but not 
significant, consistent with the similarity between the post-SOX changes of bond spreads of the 
                                                                                                                                                             
significantly related to board independence for the largest firms in their sample (Table 5 in their study), which are 
comparable to the sample firms in our study. 
22 Our results are similar for a sample with propensity score on the “common support” (between minimum score for 
the treated and maximum score for the control firms). The results are also similar for a “trimmed” sample with 
propensity score between 0.1 and 0.9, the efficiency bound suggested by Crump et al. (2009).   
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noncompliant and compliant firms as shown in Table 1. In light of the benefits and costs of 
independent directors on bondholders, and given that we control for equity volatility and payout 
variables in the model, this result suggests that the costs of independent directors on bondholders 
other than their potential effects on managerial risk-taking and payout policy may balance out 
their benefits. The insignificant effect of board independence on the cost of debt as we document 
is in contrast with most related studies, which find a beneficial effect of independence on 
bondholders (Bhojraj and Sengupta, 2003; Anderson et al., 2004; Ertugrul and Hegde, 2008).  
As expected, equity volatility is associated with a higher cost of debt, consistent with the idea 
that managerial risk-taking is detrimental to bondholders’ wealth. However, the two payout 
variables are not significant, which may suggest that the detrimental effect of a wealth transfer 
through corporate payouts and their beneficial effect of “signaling” of future profitability are 
both present for bondholders (Maxwell and Stephens, 2003; Jun et al., 2009). Other significant 
control variables generally have their expected signs except for bond age and firm age. Though 
predicted to be positive (negative), bond (firm) age is negatively (positively) related to spread.  
In Models 2-5 of Table 3 we follow specification (2) to examine a differential impact of board 
independence on the cost of debt conditional on the four indicators of the expected B/S conflict 
as discussed in Section 2.3.3, respectively. Because higher rating (Z-score, interest coverage 
ratio) suggests less intensive B/S conflict but higher leverage indicates the opposite, a differential 
effect implies that Noncompliant * Post-SOX * Rate (Z-score, Int_cov) and Noncompliant * 
Post-SOX * Leverage should be significant but with opposite signs. Indeed, the results in Table 3 
show that Noncompliant * Post-SOX * Rate (Z-score, Int_cov) is negative and significant, and 
Noncompliant * Post-SOX * Leverage is positive and significant, suggesting that with the 
intensification of the B/S conflict, board independence is increasingly costly to bondholders. The 
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coefficients on Noncompliant * Post-SOX * BSCP (B/S conflict proxy) and Noncompliant * 
Post-SOX also suggest that while board independence is beneficial to bondholders under mild 
B/S conflict, it is detrimental to bondholders when the conflict is severe. For example, because in 
our sample the lowest rating value is 7 (B-), the results in Model 2 suggest that the net 
coefficient on Noncompliant * Post-SOX is 1.571 (=2.831-0.180*7) under the lowest rating and 
hence the severest B/S conflict. On the other hand, since the highest rating is 22 (AAA), the net 
coefficient on Noncompliant * Post-SOX is -1.129 (=2.831-0.180*22) under the highest rating 
and the mildest conflict. With regard to the different rates of changes of benefits and costs of 
board independence on bondholders in relation to the B/S conflict, this evidence suggests that 
while the costs of board independence are smaller than its benefits when the B/S conflict is 
small, the costs increase at a faster rate and eventually exceed the benefits when the conflict 
intensifies. This result also implies a potentially much stronger effect of board independence on 
the cost of debt given a certain degree of the B/S conflict as compared with the average effect. 
We show that this is the case when discussing the sub-sample analysis. 
The results in Table 3 also suggest a differential effect of several control variables on the cost 
of debt. In particular, in three of the four models we find equity volatility is increasingly positive 
with the amplification of the B/S conflict, which is consistent with our argument that the agency 
costs of debt are increasing with the severity of the conflict. In two of the four models we also 
document a similar effect for cash dividends and stock repurchases. 
In Table 4 we employ the sub-sample analysis to examine the robustness of our results. As 
discussed earlier, a disadvantage of this analysis is that the division of the full sample into sub-
samples is arbitrary. The finer the division, the more homogeneous the firms within each sub-
sample in terms of their B/S conflict, the better it serves our purpose of identifying the effect of 
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board independence on the cost of debt conditional on the B/S conflict. However, the small 
number of noncompliant firms/bonds in our study does not permit a very fine division. Therefore, 
we choose to divide the full sample into two sub-samples based on the median value of credit 
ratings (Z-scores, interest coverage ratios, leverages) in the sample.23  
The results in Table 4 show an opposite effect of board independence on the cost of debt 
depending on the level of the B/S conflict and, with the exception of the results with respect to 
interest coverage ratio, all results are significant. 24 In unreported analyses, we find that the 
coefficients are also statistically different across the sub-samples based on the Chow tests. 
Consistent with the interaction results in Table 3, the sub-sample results in Table 4 show that 
while exogenously increasing independence results in an increase in bond spreads for firms with 
severe B/S conflict, it leads to a decrease in spreads when the conflict is mild.25  
Turning to the economic significance of the results, we note that the average board size of the 
low-rated sample is 10.45. As shown in Table 1, the mean spread and the difference between the 
increases of independence of the noncompliant and compliant firms of low-rated firms are 
3.07(%) and 0.13, respectively. Therefore, the coefficient on Noncompliant * Post-SOX, 0.803, 
suggests that adding one more independent director to the average firm of the low-rated sample 
(to replace a non-independent director) results in a substantial 19.3% (=0.803/0.13*(1/10.45) 
/3.07) increase in its cost of debt. Similar calculation suggests that adding one more independent 
director to the average high-rated firm results in a significant 17.3% decrease in the cost of 
                                                 
23 The median values are based on the issue-level samples. Our results are similar if we divide the full sample based 
on the firm-level median values. 
24 If we run regressions respectively on sub-samples with interest coverage ratios greater than their 75th percentile 
and less than the 25th percentile, which presumably include firms with more homogenous B/S conflicts, we find that 
the negative effect is significant at the 5% level and the positive effect is weakly significant at the 10.4% level. The 
magnitudes of the coefficients are also larger than those in Models 5 and 6, consistent with expectations. 
25 In unreported analysis, we interact each control variable in Table 4 with a pre-SOX dummy and the post-SOX 
dummy, respectively. This considers the possibility that SOX may have changed the impact of a certain variable on 
the cost of debt. We find the results are qualitatively similar. We also do the same for the risk-taking and payout 
regressions, and document similar results as well. 
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debt.26 Compared with related studies, the impact of board independence in our study is much 
larger. Different samples and time periods, as well as different empirical methodologies may 
provide some explanations for the difference in results. However, we believe that the most 
important reason for the difference is the conditioning of the regressions on the expected B/S 
conflict. The sub-samples presumably have much more homogenous B/S conflicts compared 
with full samples in other studies. As a result, the effects of board independence on the cost of 
debt within sub-samples may also be substantially larger. Consistent with this explanation, we 
note that the average effect of independence based on the full sample is insignificant in our study. 
Similar to the interaction results in Table 3, Table 4 also suggests a differential impact of 
some control variables. Interestingly, depending on the B/S conflict, the effects of dividend 
payout on the cost of debt are opposite to each other. While dividend payout benefits 
bondholders under mild B/S conflict, it hurts bondholders if the conflict is severe. In contrast, the 
effect of stock repurchases is consistently negative, which suggests that repurchases may not be 
harmful to bondholders. As noted above, these results provide some evidence consistent with the 
two opposite but non-mutually exclusive roles of corporate payouts, wealth transfer and 
signaling, as documented in the literature (Maxwell and Stephens, 2003; Jun et al., 2009). These 
results also suggest the different roles of dividends and repurchases for bondholders. 
3.4.  Board Independence and Managerial Risk-Taking and Payout Policy 
                                                 
26 This large effect of board independence in reducing the cost of debt, coupled with the beneficial effect of 
independence on shareholders, raises an interesting question: why firms with less B/S conflict did not increase their 
independence sufficiently before SOX, since they still benefited from an externally-imposed higher independence 
standard due to SOX? One plausible explanation is the role management plays. As we argue and most empirical 
evidence supports, independent directors generally perform a more effective monitoring role, which may reduce 
managerial opportunism. Therefore, in the absence of external regulations, management may attempt to prevent the 
board from reaching its optimal composition. As a support to this argument, we note that our propensity score 
analysis in Table 2 suggests that a more powerful CEO as characterized by more shareholdings and committee 
memberships, is associated with lower board independence.   
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Our argument in this study is that board independence may be beneficial as well as costly to 
bondholders due to the B/S conflict. In the cost of debt regressions, we control for equity 
volatility and payout variables, in an attempt to examine whether the two examples of corporate 
actions, managerial risk-taking and corporate payout, are indeed detrimental to bondholders, and 
whether their adverse effects are increasing with the B/S conflict. To provide some direct 
evidence of the role independent directors may play in these corporate outcomes, we examine in 
this subsection the effects of board independence on equity volatility, cash dividends, and stock 
repurchases, using specification (3). The results are reported in Table 5.  
Model 1 shows that compared with compliant firms, equity volatility of noncompliant firms 
increased significantly post SOX. To gauge the economic significance of this result, we note 
from Panel C of Table 1 that the noncompliant firms overall increased their board independence 
by 0.17 more than the compliant firms. In our sample the average board size is 9.51 and the 
average equity volatility is -3.77. So adding one more independent director results in a 0.64% 
increase in volatility for the average firm in the sample. Compared with some financial variables, 
the effect of board independence on firm risk is small, but not negligible. 
Model 1 also suggests that firms on average decreased risk-taking after SOX as shown by a 
negative Post-SOX dummy. This evidence is consistent with the extant studies (e.g., Cohen et al., 
2009; Bargeron et al., 2010), which argue that SOX discourages firms from taking risks. Given 
the positive effect of board independence on risk-taking, however, we provide a refined version 
of this argument that although many provisions of SOX may discourage risk-taking, a higher 
independence requirement nevertheless encourages risk-taking. 
Model 1 also shows that several risk-taking policy variables, including R&D expense, 
leverage, and cash balance are significantly associated with equity volatility, and the signs on 
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these variables are consistent with expectations. In the robustness checks we further examine the 
effect of board independence on these variables. 
The other two models in Table 5 examine the effect of board independence on payout policy. 
We do not document a significant effect of independence on either cash dividends or stock 
repurchases. These results are consistent with some studies (White, 1996; Farinha, 2003) but 
inconsistent with others (Hu and Kumar, 2004; Sharma, 2011). We note that among the related 
studies, ours is the only one that employs a natural experiment to solve the endogeneity problem. 
In summary, our empirical analysis suggests that board independence is increasingly costly to 
bondholders with the intensification of the B/S conflict. Our evidence is consistent with the idea 
that though the benefits of independent directors dominate their costs when the B/S conflict is 
mild, the costs may increase at a faster rate than the benefits when the conflict is severer, 
eventually catching up and exceeding the benefits at a certain degree of the conflict. In 
examining the effects of board independence on two corporate actions that may be detrimental to 
bondholders, we find a risk-increasing effect of higher independence. However, we do not detect 
a significant effect of independence on corporate payout policy. 
4. Robustness Checks 
4.1. Propensity Score Matching 
Our primary empirical analysis employs propensity score weighted DID regressions. One 
advantage of this methodology is that it can preserve the sample size as much as possible. In 
addition to this method, Imbens and Wooldridge (2009) also recommend combining regressions 
with propensity score matching. We thus use the propensity score matched DID regressions to 
examine the robustness of our primary finding of a differential impact of board independence on 
the cost of debt conditional on the expected B/S conflict. We entertain several matching 
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algorithms: one-to-one matching without replacement, nearest neighbor matching with five 
compliant firms (if available) matched with each noncompliant firm, and kernel matching. The 
results based on these matching methods are reported in Table 6. To conserve space, we only 
report the results with respect to credit ratings, but note that the results on the other proxies of the 
B/S conflict are similar. The results in Table 6 are consistent with those in Table 3, thus 
providing support to our primary findings.  
4.2. Board Independence and Risk-Taking Corporate Policies 
In the primary empirical analysis we use equity volatility as a measure of managerial risk-
taking. As discussed earlier, a drawback of this measure is that volatility is affected by factors 
beyond the management control. Therefore, in this subsection we employ the propensity score 
weighted DID methodology to examine the effects of board independence on three corporate 
policies that are commonly used as indicators of managerial risk-taking, R&D expense (Cohen et 
al., 2009), leverage (Cain and Mckeon, 2013), and cash balance (Bargeron et al., 2010). These 
variables are also significantly associated with equity volatility as shown in Table 5. The control 
variables in the policy regressions are similar to those in the volatility regression, except that we 
do not control for the policy variables themselves and the lagged volatility.27 In the leverage 
regression we also control for PPE. The results are reported in Table 7. 
Model 1 shows that board independence is positively associated with R&D expense, but the 
effect is not significant. Model 2 suggests a similar effect for leverage. But in both Models a 
majority of the control variables are not significant. If we drop the insignificant variables from 
the leverage model, board independence becomes significant at the 5% level, as shown in Model 
3. Dropping the insignificant variables from the R&D model does not alter the results. Finally, 
                                                 
27 Our results are similar if keeping the lagged volatility in the regressions, or controlling for the lagged policy 
variables in the respective models. 
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the results in Model 4 show that independent directors set lower cash balances, which also 
indicates risk-taking behavior. By and large, Table 7 provides some evidence consistent with the 
equity volatility results, corroborating the idea that an exogenous increase of board independence 
leads to more managerial risk-taking. 
5. Conclusion 
We reexamine the effect of board independence on the cost of debt, with a focus on a 
potentially differential impact conditional on the expected severity of the agency conflict 
between shareholders and bondholders. Our thesis is that because independent directors 
generally act in the interest of shareholders, some of their monitoring functions may be costly to 
bondholders, in light of the conflict of interests between the two stakeholders. Recognizing both 
benefits and costs of board independence, and especially considering their possibly different 
rates of changes with the intensification of the B/S conflict, a differential effect of independence 
on the cost of debt is expected.  
Using SOX as a natural experiment and propensity score weighted DID regressions, we 
document empirical evidence that is consistent with this idea. While board independence 
significantly reduces the cost of debt when the B/S conflict is mild, it substantially increases the 
cost of debt when the conflict is severe. We also find a risk-increasing effect of independence, 
providing some direct evidence on the costly corporate actions for bondholders that independent 
directors may be associated with.  
Our study offers several insights into the academic literature and public policies. The 
divergent effect of board independence on the cost of debt provides clear evidence against the 
“one-size-fits-all” approach for regulations. It also offers another example in support of the 
argument that “good” governance from the perspective of one stakeholder may not be good for 
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other stakeholders, especially under certain contingencies. Unlike the common perception in the 
literature that corporate governance matters more for bondholders when the default risk is higher, 
we show that not only the magnitude, but also the direction of the governance mechanism on the 
cost of debt may change with the credit condition of a firm.  
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Appendix 
 Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition Data Source 
Spread The difference between the yield-to-maturity (YTM) of a bond issue and 
the YTM of the Treasury bond with the closest maturity. 
S&P Snapshot 
Per_ind Percent of independent directors to total board size. Because the 
definition of independence in RiskMetrics is stricter than that of the 
exchanges, we reclassify an affiliated director according to RiskMetrics 
as independent if she was a former employee of the firm but had 
terminated the employment for at least three years, does not provide any 
professional services to the firm, and is not an interlocking director. 
RiskMetrics 
Ind_audit Dummy variable that equals one if the audit committee of a firm is 
composed entirely of independent directors, and zero otherwise. 
RiskMetrics 
Noncompliant Dummy variable that equals one if independent directors were less than 
majority at 2002 but became majority over 2003 and 2005, or the audit 
committee was not composed entirely of independent directors at 2002 
and the firm increased the independence of the whole board between 
2003 and 2005, and zero otherwise. 
RiskMetrics 
Rate Numerical coding of the S&P long-term domestic issuer credit ratings 
(data280). Ranges from 1(debt in default) to 22 (AAA-rated). We then 
group the S&P credit ratings into 7 categories to form the Grate variable. 
Specifically, Grate=1 if rating<=CCC+; Grate=2 if CCC+<rating 
<=B+; Grate=3 if B+<rating<=BB+; Grate=4 if BB+<rating<=BBB+; 
Grate=5 if BBB+<rating<=A+; Grate=6 if A+<rating<=AA+; Grate=7 if 
rating>AA+. Rating dummies are based on Grate.  
COMPUSTAT 
Z-score Altman’s Z-score, composite score indicating the distance to financial 
default, defined as (3.3*(data15+data16+data18+data49)/data6+ 
1.0*data12/data6+1.4*data36/data6+1.2*(data4-
data5)/data6+0.6*data199* 
data25/(data9+data34)). 
COMPUSTAT 
Int_cov Interest coverage ratio (data13/(data15 or data339 if data15=0 or data15 
is not available)). 
COMPUSTAT 
Leverage Market leverage ratio ((data9+data34)/(data9+data34+data199*data25)). COMPUSTAT 
Volat The log of the standard deviation of daily stock returns for at least 100 
days over the year. 
CRSP 
Dividend Annual cash dividends for common stock scaled by total assets 
(data26*data25/data6). 
COMPUSTAT 
Repurchase Annual repurchases of common and preferred stocks scaled by total 
assets (data115/data6). 
COMPUSTAT 
Duration The log of the modified duration of a bond.  S&P Snapshot 
Convexity The log of the convexity of a bond. S&P Snapshot 
Bond age The log of the number of years since a bond was issued. S&P Snapshot 
Size The log of market capitalization (log(data199*data25)). COMPUSTAT 
ROA Return on asset (data13/data6). COMPUSTAT 
Mb Market-to-book ratio ((data6-data60+data199*data25)/data6). COMPUSTAT 
Salesgrow The log of sales growth rate (log(data12/lagged data12)). COMPUSTAT 
Firm age The log of the number of years since a firm was publicly traded. COMPUSTAT 
Vega The log of 0.001 plus the sensitivity of CEO option portfolio value to a 
0.01 change in the annualized standard deviation of stock returns, where 
the estimation of the sensitivity follows the “one-year approximation” 
(OA) method in Core and Guay (2002). Specifically, for the estimation 
inputs we use the annualized standard deviation of monthly stock returns 
EXECUCOMP 
  32
over the past 60 months, and the average dividend yield over the past 
three years. Risk-free rates are the YTM of the Treasury bonds matched 
by the closest maturities. 
Delta The log of 0.001 plus the sensitivity of CEO option and stock portfolio 
value to a 1% change in stock price, where the estimation of the 
sensitivity follows the OA method. Specifically, for the estimation inputs 
we use the annualized standard deviation of monthly stock returns over 
the past 60 months, and the average dividend yield over the past three 
years. Risk-free rates are the YTM of the Treasury bonds matched by the 
closest maturities. 
EXECUCOMP 
CEO tenure The log of 0.001 plus CEO tenure in years. EXECUCOMP 
CEO age The log of CEO age in years. EXECUCOMP 
R&D R&D expenses scaled by total assets, missing values coded as zeros 
(data46/data6). 
COMPUSTAT 
Capexp Net capital expenditure scaled by total assets, missing values coded as 
zeros ((data128-data107)/data6). 
COMPUSTAT 
Cash balance The log of cash balance scaled by total assets (log(data1/data6)). COMPUSTAT 
Segment The log of number of business segments. COMPUSTAT 
CEO shares Percent shareholding of a CEO. EXECUCOMP 
Unexercisable options Percent of the unexercisable options held by a CEO to total shares 
outstanding. 
EXECUCOMP 
Exercisable options Percent of unexercised exercisable options held by a CEO to total shares 
outstanding. 
EXECUCOMP 
Stock return Cumulative annual stock return over the year. CRSP 
PPE Net PPE scaled by total assets (data8/data6). COMPUSTAT 
Cash flow Free cash flow ((data18-data14)/lagged data8) COMPUSTAT 
G-index The sum of 24 dummy variables indicating the presence or absence of 
firm-level antitakeover provisions or state-level antitakeover statutes.  
RiskMetrics 
CEO nom Dummy variable that equals one if a CEO sits on her firm’s nomination 
or governance committee, or the firm does not have a nomination and 
governance committee, and zero otherwise.  
RiskMetrics 
CEO comp Dummy variable that equals one if a CEO sits on her firm’s compensation 
committee or the firm does not have a compensation committee, and zero 
otherwise. 
RiskMetrics 
Ind director shares Aggregate percent shareholding of all independent directors. RiskMetrics 
Herfindahl sales Herfindahl index of industry sales based on COMPUSTAT firms COMPUSTAT 
Loss Dummy variable that equals one if both current and previous earnings are 
negative. 
COMPUSTAT 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics and Compliance Trend  
This table reports the summary statistics of the variables used in the empirical analysis, the compliance trend, and 
the comparison between the changes of some key variables of interest of the noncompliant and compliant firms 
between 2002 and 2005. Panel A reports the summary statistics for the full samples, as well as the sub-samples 
stratified by the median rating in the cost of debt sample (BBB+). The full samples include both the bond-level cost 
of debt sample between 2001 and 2005, and the firm-level risk-taking and payout samples between 1996 and 2005. 
Panel B reports the time trend of noncompliance. Panel C compares the changes of some key variables of interest 
over 2002 and 2005 between the noncompliant and compliant firms. Next X stands for the value of X in the 
following year. %Per_ind<0.5 is the fraction of firms in a given year with less than majority independent boards. 
%Ind_audit=0 is the fraction of firms in a given year without fully independent audit committees. %Per_ind<0.5 or 
Ind_audit=0 is the fraction of firms in a given year with less than majority independent boards or fully independent 
audit committees. Δ stands for the change of a variable between 2002 and 2005. Ind_audit=0 and Per_ind>=0.5 at 
2002 indicates firms that did not have fully independent audit committees but had majority independent boards at 
2002, and increased their board independence after 2002. Num_ind (Num_inside, Num_link) is the number of 
independent (executive, affiliated) directors on a board. The numbers within the parentheses in Panel C represent the 
numbers of firms/bonds that the statistics are based on. See the Appendix for the definitions of other variables. The 
statistics for Bond age, CEO tenure, CEO age, Firm age, and Segment are reported in their raw format without 
taking logs. Spread, Leverage, Next dividend, Dividend, Next repurchase, Repurchase, ROA, Mb, R&D, Capexp, 
CEO shares, Unexercisable options, Exercisable options, and Stock return have been winsorized at the 1st and 99th 
percentiles. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.     
Panel A: Summary Statistics 
Full Sample 
Variable Observations P25 Mean Median P75 Std 
Spread (%) 6252 1.02 2.46 1.53 2.59 3.64 
Per_ind 8283 0.57 0.68 0.71 0.82 0.18 
Ind_audit 7038 1 0.76 1 1 0.43 
Rate 6252 13 15.1 15 17 2.76 
Z-score 3406 1.97 4.59 3.53 5.63 4.83 
Int_cov 6203 3.81 9.6 6.47 11.79 11.01 
Leverage (spread sample) 6252 0.12 0.23 0.2 0.31 0.15 
Volat 8328 -4.04 -3.74 -3.76 -3.44 0.44 
Next volat 8329 -4.06 -3.77 -3.79 -3.48 0.44 
Dividend 8329 0 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 
Next dividend 7965 0 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 
Repurchase 7735 0 0.03 0 0.03 0.05 
Next repurchase 7428 0 0.03 0 0.04 0.05 
Duration (log years) 6252 0.97 1.39 1.57 2 0.93 
Convexity (log years) 6252 2.15 3.09 3.36 4.23 1.74 
Bond age (years) 6252 1.84 4.9 3.94 7.27 3.87 
Size (log $millions) 8329 6.57 7.68 7.53 8.67 1.56 
ROA 8329 0.09 0.14 0.14 0.19 0.08 
Mb 8329 1.21 2.01 1.56 2.29 1.28 
Salesgrow 8329 0 0.09 0.08 0.17 0.23 
Firm age (years) 8329 11.6 27.06 23.43 35.03 19.46 
Vega (log $103) 6980 3.2 3.58 4.23 5.24 3.15 
Delta (log $103) 6796 4.65 5.66 5.67 6.7 1.71 
CEO tenure (years) 8329 2.63 7.84 5.34 10.59 7.54 
CEO age (years) 7936 51 55.71 56 60 7.23 
R&D 8329 0 0.03 0 0.03 0.05 
Capexp 8329 0 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.05 
Leverage (volatility and dividend sample) 8329 0.04 0.16 0.13 0.25 0.14 
Cash balance 8327 -4.04 -2.99 -2.91 -1.77 1.52 
Segment 8213 3 5.63 5 7 3.27 
CEO shares 8098 0 0.02 0 0.01 0.05 
Unexercisable options 8327 0 0 0 0.01 0.01 
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Exercisable options 8327 0 0.01 0 0.01 0.01 
Stock return 8321 -0.12 0.16 0.1 0.35 0.44 
       
Low Rating Sample 
Variable Observations P25 Mean Median P75 Std 
Spread (%) 3459 1.32 3.07 2 3.47 4.08 
Per_ind 3459 0.67 0.73 0.78 0.86 0.18 
Rate 3459 12 13.08 14 14 1.83 
Z-score 2134 1.48 3.12 2.41 4.03 2.71 
Int_cov 3439 3.36 6.46 5.04 7.61 5.93 
Leverage 3459 0.17 0.27 0.25 0.33 0.13 
High Rating Sample 
Variable Observations P25 Mean Median P75 Std 
Spread (%) 2793 0.85 1.7 1.16 1.71 2.82 
Per_ind 2793 0.65 0.75 0.79 0.89 0.15 
Rate 2793 17 17.59 17 18 1.3 
Z-score 1272 3.77 7.07 5.55 8.56 6.35 
Int_cov 2764 5.2 13.5 10.22 15.95 14.18 
Leverage 2793 0.09 0.19 0.14 0.23 0.16 
 
Panel B: Compliance Trend 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Per_ind 0.66 0.67 0.68 0.71 0.73 0.75 
%Per_ind<0.5 15.81 14.57 13.32 7.79 4.56 3.84 
%Ind_audit=0 30.16 25.53 24.81 18.02 10.63 8.60 
%Per_ind<0.5 or Ind_audit=0 35.65 31.76 30.23 20.65 12.58 10.70 
 
Panel C: Comparison between Changes of Noncompliant and Compliant Firms 
Sample Variable Compliant firms Noncompliant firms Difference 
ΔPer_ind 0.02*** (617) 0.19*** (224) 0.17*** 
ΔNum_ind  0.27*** (617) 1.53*** (224) 1.26*** 
ΔPer_ind for Ind_audit=0 and 
Per_ind>=0.5 at 2002 0.02*** (617) 0.12*** (127) 0.10*** 
ΔNum_ind for Ind_audit=0 and 
Per_ind>=0.5 at 2002 0.27*** (617) 1.19*** (127) 0.92*** 
ΔNum_inside -0.25*** (617) -0.61*** (224) -0.36*** 
ΔNum_link 0.02 (617) -0.85*** (224) -0.87*** 
ΔBoard size 0.06 (617) 0.14 (224) 0.08 
ΔNext volat -0.23*** (617) -0.22*** (224) 0.01 
ΔNext dividend 0.003*** (516) 0.002*** (187) -0.001 
Full (volatility and 
dividend sample) 
ΔNext repurchase 0.03*** (475) 0.02*** (160) -0.01 
ΔPer_ind (issue-level) 0.02*** (514) 0.13*** (134) 0.11*** 
ΔPer_ind (firm-level) 0.01* (182) 0.16*** (50) 0.15*** 
Full (spread sample) 
ΔSpread -0.28* (514) 0.28 (134) 0.56 
ΔPer_ind (issue-level) 0.01** (262) 0.14*** (92) 0.13*** 
ΔPer_ind (firm-level) 0.01 (106) 0.18*** (32) 0.17*** 
Low Rating (spread 
sample) 
ΔSpread -1.13*** (262) 0.34 (92) 1.47*** 
ΔPer_ind (issue-level) 0.02*** (252) 0.10*** (42) 0.08*** 
ΔPer_ind (firm-level) 0.02 (76) 0.11*** (18) 0.09*** 
High Rating (spread 
sample) 
ΔSpread 0.62** (252) 0.15 (42) -0.47 
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Table 2. Propensity Score Analysis 
This table reports the results on the determinants of the probability of being a noncompliant firm at 2002 (propensity 
score). Panel A compares the characteristics of the noncompliant and compliant firms that may be relevant to 
determine noncompliance. Panel B reports the logit regression results predicting the noncompliant status. The 
sample covers S&P 1,500 firms at 2002. Lagged X refers to the lagged value of X. Lagged size ^ 2 is the square of 
the lagged firm size. See the Appendix for the definitions of other variables. All models in Panel B also include 
Fama-French 48-industry dummies and a constant term. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity. t-
statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
Panel A: Comparison between Noncompliant and Compliant Firms at 2002 
Variable Compliant firms Noncompliant firms Difference 
Lagged size 7.52 7.64 0.12 
Lagged segment 1.61 1.48 -0.13*** 
Lagged cash flow 0.61 0.52 -0.09 
Lagged mb 2.05 2.05 0.00 
Lagged salesgrow 0.02 0.04 0.02 
Lagged R&D 0.03 0.02 -0.01** 
Lagged CEO shares 0.02 0.04 0.02*** 
Lagged CEO nom 0.43 0.58 0.15*** 
Lagged CEO comp 0.02 0.11 0.09*** 
Lagged ind director shares 0.016 0.024 0.008** 
Lagged ROA 0.13 0.14 0.01 
 
Panel B: Regression Analysis on the Propensity for Noncompliant Status 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable Noncompliant Noncompliant Noncompliant Noncompliant 
     
Lagged size 0.194*** 1.024** 0.211** 0.181*** 
 (2.879) (2.260) (2.468) (3.057) 
Lagged size ^ 2  -0.052*   
  (-1.839)   
Lagged segment -0.209 -0.197 -0.343*  
 (-1.407) (-1.322) (-1.889)  
Lagged cash flow -0.159* -0.161* -0.233*  
 (-1.805) (-1.843) (-1.871)  
Lagged mb -0.166* -0.165* -0.220* -0.157** 
 (-1.711) (-1.694) (-1.737) (-2.101) 
Lagged salesgrow 0.119 0.091 0.121  
 (0.459) (0.349) (0.414)  
Lagged R&D -2.778 -2.471 -5.174  
 (-0.913) (-0.813) (-1.316)  
Lagged CEO shares 2.853** 2.939** 1.951 3.042** 
 (1.969) (2.029) (1.123) (2.136) 
Lagged CEO nom 0.518*** 0.497*** 0.392* 0.484*** 
 (2.747) (2.645) (1.798) (2.744) 
Lagged CEO comp 1.349*** 1.357*** 1.847*** 1.524*** 
 (3.329) (3.376) (3.632) (3.845) 
Lagged ind director shares 5.126*** 5.169*** 5.681*** 4.458** 
 (2.814) (2.799) (2.674) (2.530) 
Lagged ROA 1.171 1.014 2.973  
 (0.879) (0.764) (1.574)  
Firm age   -0.145  
   (-0.743)  
Lagged leverage   0.046  
   (0.049)  
Lagged Herfindahl sales   -1.375  
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   (-0.245)  
Lagged G-index   -0.029  
   (-0.777)  
Lagged PPE   -0.395  
   (-0.551)  
Lagged volat   -0.267  
   (-0.791)  
CEO tenure   0.062  
   (0.585)  
Lagged loss   0.264  
   (0.496)  
Observations 1010 1010 850 1096 
Pseudo R2 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.10 
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Table 3. The Differential Effect of Board Independence  
on Bond Spreads Conditional on Expected Agency Conflict  
between Shareholders and Bondholders (Interaction Results) 
This table reports the results using the propensity score weighted DID regressions to examine the differential effects 
of board independence on the cost of debt conditional on four proxies of the expected agency conflict between 
shareholders and bondholders, credit rating, Z-score, interest coverage ratio, and leverage. The samples cover senior 
unsecured bonds of S&P 1,500 firms from 2001 to 2005. The dependent variable is the yield spread of an 
outstanding bond in a given year. The weight is one for noncompliant firms and p/(1-p) for compliant firms, where p 
is the estimated propensity score based on Model 1 of Panel B in Table 2. Post-SOX is a dummy variable that equals 
one if the year is on or after 2003, and zero otherwise. See the Appendix for the definitions of other variables. All 
models also include rating dummies, firm fixed effects, and a constant term. Standard errors are adjusted for 
heteroscedasticity, and clustered at both the bond (same bond across different years) and firm-year (different bonds 
of the same firm in a given year) levels. t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
BSCP  Rate Z-score Int_cov Leverage 
      
Noncompliant * Post-SOX 0.131 2.831*** 0.967*** 0.598* -1.444*** 
 (0.678) (2.996) (2.854) (1.859) (-3.860) 
Noncompliant * Post-SOX * BSCP  -0.180*** -0.210*** -0.051** 6.996*** 
  (-3.093) (-3.744) (-2.242) (3.676) 
Volat * BSCP  -0.175*** -0.087** -0.032* 2.814 
  (-2.611) (-2.024) (-1.927) (1.611) 
Volat 0.687*** 2.994*** 1.208*** 0.909*** -0.178 
 (3.097) (2.681) (4.059) (3.053) (-0.444) 
Dividend * BSCP  -8.199*** -1.609 -0.292 156.554** 
  (-3.224) (-1.012) (-0.805) (2.004) 
Dividend -2.086 116.747*** 13.043 1.442 -30.590** 
 (-0.206) (3.025) (1.103) (0.121) (-2.155) 
Repurchase * BSCP  -0.424 -0.365* -0.001 32.801** 
  (-0.948) (-1.718) (-0.009) (2.269) 
Repurchase -0.161 5.398 0.363 -0.530 -5.340** 
 (-0.145) (0.767) (0.190) (-0.343) (-2.321) 
Noncompliant * BSCP  -0.233 0.240*** 0.047 -4.822** 
  (-1.192) (3.064) (1.642) (-2.095) 
Post-SOX * BSCP  0.210*** 0.002 0.029* -3.045** 
  (3.546) (0.067) (1.921) (-2.236) 
Post-SOX -0.280 -3.774*** -0.201 -0.599** 0.239 
 (-1.610) (-3.942) (-0.821) (-2.382) (0.839) 
Duration * BSCP  0.235 -0.256 0.051 -8.412* 
  (0.648) (-1.441) (0.873) (-1.764) 
Duration -16.968*** -20.422*** -15.068*** -17.545*** -14.433*** 
 (-18.169) (-3.418) (-8.990) (-14.424) (-9.992) 
Convexity * BSCP  -0.054 0.138 -0.019 3.624 
  (-0.313) (1.520) (-0.645) (1.596) 
Convexity 8.209*** 8.953*** 7.299*** 8.439*** 7.074*** 
 (17.945) (3.180) (8.558) (14.309) (9.873) 
Bond age * BSCP  0.011 -0.016 0.002 -0.223 
  (0.453) (-1.577) (0.499) (-0.396) 
Bond age -0.090* -0.271 0.050 -0.108 -0.026 
 (-1.748) (-0.656) (0.680) (-1.380) (-0.245) 
Leverage * BSCP  -0.388 -0.211 -0.150 -1.407 
  (-0.664) (-0.267) (-1.118) (-0.218) 
Leverage -1.836 2.584 3.868** -1.658 20.291* 
 (-1.036) (0.317) (1.979) (-0.889) (1.793) 
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Size * BSCP  0.094 0.095*** 0.022*** -2.992*** 
  (1.329) (3.157) (2.971) (-3.017) 
Size -2.313*** -3.199*** -1.586*** -2.390*** -1.111*** 
 (-5.733) (-3.016) (-4.238) (-5.707) (-2.929) 
ROA * BSCP  2.346*** 0.637** 0.060 -13.837 
  (3.177) (2.015) (0.714) (-0.666) 
ROA 1.044 -32.680*** -2.038 3.068 3.640 
 (0.519) (-2.887) (-0.701) (1.123) (1.099) 
Mb * BSCP  -0.045 -0.017 -0.010 1.026 
  (-0.979) (-0.825) (-1.515) (0.406) 
Mb 0.711*** 1.390* 0.583** 0.856*** 0.362* 
 (3.955) (1.672) (2.121) (3.004) (1.920) 
Salesgrow * BSCP  -0.055 -0.065* -0.024 8.373*** 
  (-0.627) (-1.669) (-1.471) (4.016) 
Salesgrow 0.396* 1.234 -0.160 0.772*** -1.618*** 
 (1.792) (0.993) (-0.605) (2.655) (-3.448) 
Firm age * BSCP  -0.595*** 0.004 0.000 6.222*** 
  (-2.641) (0.069) (0.005) (3.017) 
Firm age 1.972** 10.240*** 1.457* 2.083** 0.288 
 (2.450) (2.986) (1.813) (2.545) (0.342) 
Observations 6252 6252 3406 6203 6252 
Adjusted R2 0.47 0.52 0.53 0.48 0.50 
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Table 4. The Differential Effect of Board Independence  
on Bond Spreads Conditional on Expected Agency Conflict  
between Shareholders and Bondholders (Sub-Sample Results) 
This table reports the results using the propensity score weighted DID regressions to examine the differential effects of board independence on the cost of debt 
conditional on sub-samples characterized by different expected agency conflict between shareholders and bondholders, as proxied by credit rating, Z-score, 
interest coverage ratio, and leverage, respectively. The samples cover senior unsecured bonds of S&P 1,500 firms from 2001 to 2005. Low (High) Rating (Z-
score, Interest coverage ratio, Leverage) is the sub-sample with ratings (Z-scores, interest coverage ratios, leverages) at or below (above) the median value in the 
sample. The dependent variable is the yield spread of an outstanding bond in a given year. The weight is one for noncompliant firms and p/(1-p) for compliant 
firms, where p is the estimated propensity score based on Model 1 of Panel B in Table 2. Post-SOX is a dummy variable that equals one if the year is on or after 
2003, and zero otherwise. See the Appendix for the definitions of other variables. All models also include rating dummies, firm fixed effects, and a constant term. 
Standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity, and clustered at both the bond and firm-year levels. t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Sample Low Rating High Rating Low Z-score High Z-score Low Interest 
coverage ratio 
High Interest 
coverage ratio 
Low 
Leverage  
High 
Leverage  
         
Noncompliant * Post-SOX 0.803*** -0.281* 0.639* -0.309* 0.509 -0.226 -0.404** 0.732** 
 (2.668) (-1.830) (1.754) (-1.647) (1.561) (-1.507) (-2.262) (2.140) 
Post-SOX -0.887*** -0.097 -0.588** -0.309* -0.596** -0.273* -0.007 -0.814*** 
 (-3.237) (-0.699) (-1.996) (-1.760) (-2.059) (-1.874) (-0.046) (-2.580) 
Volat 1.107*** 0.211 0.831** 0.081 0.884** 0.100 0.458** 1.022*** 
 (3.444) (1.107) (2.281) (0.324) (2.399) (0.637) (2.373) (2.750) 
Dividend 15.174 -16.812** 16.013 -16.007 35.812** -26.496** -17.932* 25.238 
 (1.157) (-2.162) (1.242) (-1.200) (2.050) (-2.314) (-1.693) (1.448) 
Repurchase -2.313 -0.318 -8.029* -2.012 -2.526 -0.572 -0.626 -3.673 
 (-1.295) (-0.318) (-1.920) (-1.558) (-0.629) (-0.743) (-0.667) (-1.157) 
Duration -17.492*** -16.487*** -15.943*** -16.867*** -17.995*** -15.753*** -15.505*** -18.072*** 
 (-11.508) (-16.164) (-8.617) (-14.764) (-12.219) (-15.750) (-15.366) (-12.551) 
Convexity 8.350*** 8.118*** 7.775*** 8.253*** 8.697*** 7.623*** 7.492*** 8.757*** 
 (11.334) (15.596) (8.318) (14.299) (12.205) (15.202) (14.811) (12.527) 
Bond age -0.089 -0.092** -0.024 -0.025 -0.154* -0.044 -0.018 -0.160* 
 (-1.040) (-2.474) (-0.359) (-0.614) (-1.835) (-1.116) (-0.489) (-1.953) 
Leverage -5.532** 4.128*** 2.667 3.286* -5.568** 1.637 -1.922 -3.096 
 (-2.528) (2.611) (0.976) (1.774) (-2.245) (1.051) (-0.868) (-1.227) 
Size -3.273*** -0.000 -2.233*** -0.197 -3.690*** -0.275 -0.814** -3.479*** 
 (-6.225) (-0.002) (-3.971) (-0.752) (-6.325) (-1.348) (-2.353) (-5.494) 
ROA 1.027 1.822 -3.837 2.118 -2.820 0.565 -1.149 0.432 
 (0.383) (1.111) (-0.837) (1.282) (-0.580) (0.430) (-0.725) (0.098) 
Mb 1.764*** 0.204** 0.892 0.141 0.568 0.139 0.325*** 0.852 
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 (2.930) (1.985) (1.035) (1.207) (0.640) (1.599) (2.661) (0.728) 
Salesgrow 0.386 0.071 0.289 -0.725** 1.141*** -0.419* -0.640* 0.883*** 
 (1.357) (0.272) (1.118) (-2.469) (3.420) (-1.659) (-1.896) (2.844) 
Firm age 3.182** -0.432 4.167*** -1.141 3.599* -0.932* -0.586 6.003*** 
 (2.452) (-0.673) (2.620) (-1.219) (1.769) (-1.862) (-0.812) (2.657) 
Observations 3459 2793 1705 1701 3114 3089 3127 3125 
Adjusted R2 0.45 0.56 0.44 0.66 0.43 0.58 0.56 0.43 
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Table 5. The Effect of Board Independence on Firm Risk and Payout Policy 
This table reports the results using the propensity score weighted difference-in-differences (DID) regressions to 
examine the effects of board independence on firm risk and payout policy. The sample covers S&P 1,500 firms from 
1996 to 2005. The weight is one for noncompliant firms and p/(1-p) for compliant firms, where p is the estimated 
probability of being a noncompliant firm at 2002 (propensity score) based on Model 1 of Panel B in Table 2. Post-
SOX is a dummy variable that equals one if the year is on or after 2003, and zero otherwise. Next X stands for the 
value of X in the following year. See the Appendix for the definitions of other variables. All models also include 
firm fixed effects and a constant term. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustered at the firm 
level. t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent variable Next volat Next dividend Next repurchase 
    
Noncompliant * Post-SOX 0.039** -0.000 0.002 
 (2.117) (-0.226) (0.587) 
Post-SOX -0.244*** 0.001** 0.003 
 (-14.639) (2.087) (1.451) 
Vega -0.002   
 (-0.773)   
Delta 0.008   
 (1.591)   
CEO tenure 0.001 0.000 0.001 
 (0.135) (1.611) (0.646) 
CEO age 0.048   
 (0.714)   
Size -0.009 -0.000 0.006** 
 (-0.549) (-0.223) (2.296) 
ROA -0.308*** 0.013** 0.102*** 
 (-2.708) (2.568) (4.274) 
Mb 0.068*** 0.000 -0.001 
 (7.873) (0.178) (-0.403) 
Salesgrow 0.112*** -0.002*** -0.012*** 
 (4.806) (-2.895) (-3.019) 
Firm age -0.170*** 0.002 0.006 
 (-5.203) (1.031) (0.975) 
R&D 0.683**   
 (2.138)   
Capexp 0.016   
 (0.119)   
Leverage 0.149* -0.018*** -0.062*** 
 (1.782) (-4.520) (-4.294) 
Cash balance -0.018*** 0.000 0.004*** 
 (-3.065) (1.014) (3.683) 
Segment 0.019   
 (1.266)   
Volat 0.346***   
 (16.368)   
CEO shares  -0.017** -0.033 
  (-2.131) (-0.975) 
Unexercisable options  -0.114* -0.278 
  (-1.748) (-1.261) 
Exercisable options  -0.037 -0.472*** 
  (-0.927) (-2.604) 
Stock return  -0.000 -0.001 
  (-1.365) (-0.593) 
Observations 6455 7733 7223 
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Adjusted R2 0.74 0.81 0.46 
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Table 6.  Robustness Check by Propensity Score Matching 
This table reports the results using the propensity score matched DID regressions to check the robustness of the 
results with respect to the differential effects of board independence on the cost of debt conditional on credit ratings. 
Results using three matching methods are presented: one-to-one matching without replacement (One-to-one), 
nearest neighbor matching with five compliant firms (if available) matched with each noncompliant firm (Nearest 
five neighbors), and kernel matching (Kernel). The samples cover senior unsecured bonds of S&P 1,500 firms from 
2001 to 2005. The dependent variable is the yield spread of an outstanding bond in a given year. The weight is one 
for noncompliant firms and p/(1-p) for compliant firms, where p is the estimated propensity score based on Model 1 
of Panel B in Table 2. Post-SOX is a dummy variable that equals one if the year is on or after 2003, and zero 
otherwise. See the Appendix for the definitions of other variables. All models also include the control variables as in 
Model 2 of Table 3, rating dummies, firm fixed effects, and a constant term. Standard errors are adjusted for 
heteroscedasticity, and clustered at both the bond and firm-year levels. t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Matching method One-to-one Nearest five neighbors Kernel 
    
Noncompliant * Post-SOX * Rate  -0.232** -0.230*** -0.211*** 
 (-2.451) (-3.149) (-3.381) 
Noncompliant * Post-SOX 3.551** 3.582*** 3.321*** 
 (2.375) (3.089) (3.344) 
Volat * Rate -0.157 -0.273*** -0.190** 
 (-1.448) (-2.858) (-2.394) 
Volat 2.793 4.604*** 3.270** 
 (1.568) (2.917) (2.540) 
Dividend * Rate -3.908 -5.615 -8.107*** 
 (-1.125) (-1.505) (-3.219) 
Dividend 50.691 86.060 121.881*** 
 (0.946) (1.413) (3.166) 
Repurchase * Rate -0.336 -0.523 -0.437 
 (-0.512) (-0.928) (-0.972) 
Repurchase 4.978 5.900 5.382 
 (0.485) (0.692) (0.766) 
Observations 2366 4061 5992 
Adjusted R2 0.52 0.53 0.51 
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Table 7. The Effect of Board Independence on Risk-Taking Policies 
This table reports the results using the propensity score weighted DID regressions to examine the effects of board 
independence on risk-taking corporate policies. The sample covers S&P 1,500 firms from 1996 to 2005. The weight 
is one for noncompliant firms and p/(1-p) for compliant firms, where p is the estimated propensity score based on 
Model 1 of Panel B in Table 2. Next X stands for the value of X in the following year. Post-SOX is a dummy 
variable that equals one if the year is on or after 2003, and zero otherwise. See the Appendix for the definitions of 
other variables. All models also include firm fixed effects and a constant term. Standard errors are adjusted for 
heteroscedasticity and clustered at the firm level. t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable Next R&D Next Leverage Next Leverage Next Cash balance 
     
Noncompliant * Post-SOX 0.001 0.010 0.013** -0.140* 
 (0.996) (1.451) (2.155) (-1.773) 
Post-SOX 0.001 -0.032*** -0.031*** 0.337*** 
 (0.963) (-6.041) (-8.207) (5.358) 
Vega 0.000 0.000  0.022** 
 (0.137) (0.413)  (2.045) 
Delta 0.000 0.001  -0.023 
 (0.567) (0.463)  (-1.059) 
CEO tenure 0.000 -0.002  -0.028 
 (0.155) (-0.669)  (-0.886) 
CEO age -0.003 -0.020  0.239 
 (-0.697) (-0.779)  (0.859) 
Size -0.002** -0.008  -0.125** 
 (-1.965) (-1.281)  (-2.198) 
ROA 0.023** -0.172*** -0.195*** -0.740 
 (2.230) (-4.281) (-5.525) (-1.505) 
Mb -0.001 -0.010*** -0.012*** 0.082** 
 (-0.979) (-4.200) (-7.005) (2.408) 
Salesgrow -0.004** 0.026*** 0.019*** -0.252*** 
 (-2.476) (2.685) (2.836) (-2.892) 
Firm age -0.001 0.018  0.370** 
 (-0.530) (1.323)  (2.556) 
PPE  -0.006   
  (-0.143)   
Observations 6278 6242 8493 6276 
Adjusted R2 0.92 0.84 0.83 0.77 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
